Hofstra Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 2

Article 10

1982

Authors' and Artists' Rights in the United States: A
Legal Fiction
Neil G. Kenduck

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kenduck, Neil G. (1982) "Authors' and Artists' Rights in the United States: A Legal Fiction," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 10: Iss. 2, Article
10.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss2/10

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Kenduck: Authors' and Artists' Rights in the United States: A Legal Fictio

AUTHORS' AND ARTISTS' RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A LEGAL FICTION
In a very real sense the greatness of a nation is measured by the
respect which it accords the creative work of its people. And a
large measure of that respect is reflected in the attitudes of the
Government toward the arts, attitudes which inevitably are embodied in the laws of the land. If the Congressfails to enact positive, effective statutes to protect the rights of artists, the United
States, with all its wealth, power, and achievements, will be judged, at best, a second rate civilization.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent best-selling novel, 2 the protagonist, a serious novelist, sold a manuscript to a profit-hungry publisher. To enhance the
marketability of the work, the publisher created a book cover that
would lead prospective readers to believe that the book detailed
events leading up to and surrounding a mysterious, catastrophic accident. Although accidents did, in fact, play a part in the novel, the
publisher well knew that the book would tell the reader nothing of
the event shown on the cover. The novelist did not learn of this distortion of his creation until the book was about to be publicly distributed, and then his reaction was one of horror.3
This story illustrates how a publisher's editorial and marketing
techniques can create a book cover that distorts its content, and suggests a fundamental fact of life for most American authors and artists: that, where the publisher distorts a work in such a manner, the
creator is without recourse. The possibilities for such unpleasant exploitation, however, far exceed this scenario. The artistic creator,
generally at the mercy of his or her publisher or other commercial
distributor, may see unauthorized changes made in his work4 or may
1.

123 Cong. Rec. 33,732 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).

2.

J. IRVING, THE WORLD ACCORDING TO GARP (1976).

3. Id. at 339-40: "[It] called for your cheap but immediate attention; it got it . ...
[H]e could imagine people buying the book in droves. He sat feeling disgusted at the people he
imagined buying the book . .. ."
4. See text accompanying notes 51-53, 102-116 infra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:557

be the victim of an improper attribution of authorship. 5 Commercial
distributors may also attribute to the artist work of quality inferior
to that by 'Which he is known, with resulting damage to the artist's
personal integrity.6
In Europe, an author victimized by his publisher in such a way
may well be able to seek judicial help to protect his work under the
doctrine of "moral rights." The moral rights doctrine, followed in

the courts of nations adhering to the Berne Convention, may be
summarized as the right of an author or artist to have his work at-

tributed to him in the form in which he created it.8 Some legal commentators maintain that American common law theories and ex-

isting federal statutes already amount to a satisfactory equivalent of
moral rights, without adoption of the Berne Convention concept.9
This note demonstrates, however, that the American patchwork ap-

proach is in many respects inferior to the protections guaranteed by
moral rights legislation. Absent contractual protection, courts gener-

ally do not recognize or enforce any semblance of moral rights; and
even American copyright law does not ensure that the integrity of
one's creation will be preserved. 10
After briefly examining the concept of moral rights1 1 and- sur-

veying the common law's treatment of artistic creators' rights,12 this
note examines federal and state statutory approaches,13 focusing on
the application, or misapplication, of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademarks Act,14 California's Art Preservation Act,1 5 and a pro5. See text accompanying notes 32-54, 79-83 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 83-93, 97-154 infra.
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: Paris Act, 1971,
done, July 24, 1971, art. 6bis [hereinafter cited as Berne Convention]. For a list of nations
signing or acceding to the Berne Convention, see 4 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT app. 22 (1978)
(revised to 1980).
8. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 8.2(A), at 8-247 (rev. vol. 1978) (revised to 1980).
9. See, e.g., Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. 506, 538
(1955); Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COmp.
L. 487, 505-06 (1968). But see, e.g., Diamond, Legal Protectionfor the "Moral Rights" of
Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 280-81 (1978). For a comparison of
French moral rights with American law, see Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of
Authors and Artists under French Law, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 465, 484-86 (1968); Merryman,
The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGs L.J. 1023, 1037-39 (1976).
10. Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEo. L.J. 1539, 1541 (1972).
11. See text accompanying notes 18-26 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 27-58 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 59-200 infra.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976); see text accompanying notes 70-179 infra.
15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1981); see text accompanying notes 180-194
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posed federal copyright amendment. 16 Finally, a proposal is offered
that addresses the heart of the controversy-contract bargaining between author and publisher-and suggests a new approach for courts
faced with esoteric issues involving art and artistic creation. 7
II. MORAL

RIGHTS AND THE

BERNE CONVENTION

The European concept of moral rights (or droit moral) is generally understood as a bundle of rights' attaching to the artist, author,
composer, performer, musician, or producer 9 and his or her creation. Even after the work is published, exhibited or performed, and
becomes the subject of commercial transactions and the property of
another, the artistic creator retains these rights over his or her
work.2o
The benefits of moral rights inure essentially to the artistic creator, rather than to the creation itself, and protect that part of his
personality embodied in his creation, and his reputation as an artist
that attaches to his work. Unlike copyright, they are not intended to
recognize and safeguard the artistic creator's economic interest in
that work. 21
The Berne Copyright Convention section on moral rights states
that:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.22
Although member nations differ in their respective approaches
and procedures for enforcing moral rights, 23 they uniformly subinfra.
16.

H.R. 2908, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); see text accompanying notes 195-200 infra.

17.

See text accompanying notes 200-203 infra.

18.

Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Rights: A-Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and

Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 558-65 (1940).
19.

For the sake of brevity, these will be referred to collectively as artistic creators.

20.

See Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 6bis, para. 1.

21.
22.

Roeder, supra note 18, at 557.
Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 6bis, para. 1.

23.

In France, for example, a nation considered sensitive to artistic interests, one's moral

rights ("droit moral') are said to be perpetual, unbarrable and inalienable. Rights of paternity

preempt tacit waivers embodied in contracts between an author and his publisher, and courts
can invalidate a commercial contract which is found to infringe on an author's right of integ-

rity. Sarraute, supra note 9, at 485-86.
The moral rights statute in the Netherlands is less rigid than its French counterpart. As
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scribe to the basic components: integrety and paternity rights.24 The
right to paternity encompasses the right of authorship, including the
right to be known to the public as the creator of a work, the right to
the protection of anonymity or a pseudonym, the right to preclude
others from crediting another as the author, and the right to prevent
others from falsely attributing to an artist work he has not created. 5
The second essential aspect, the right to integrity, includes the right
to prevent another's unauthorized modification of the work, the right
to object to destruction of the work, and the right to make desired
changes. 0
III.

COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO AUTHORS' RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES

American courts have experimented with several common law
theories in an effort to vindicate the personal rights of artistic creators. The common law affords the artistic creator only limited protection of rights of paternity and integrity.27 Because of an inherently inferior bargaining position (vis-A-vis the publisher), the nature
of the injury alleged (non-economic), and the remedy sought (usually injunctive), common law principles leave the unknown and developing artistic creator in a hopelessly vulnerable situation.28
While the United States is not a signatory to the Berne Convention, 29 and American courts in general have traditionally disavowed
one writer pointed out: "[T]he Dutch law establishes a right of paternity .. and a right of
integrity, except that the author may not object to a modification if its nature is 'such that it
would be unreasonable to object to it.' Also, although the author retains his moral rights even
after a transfer of the copyright, there is a provision for waiver 'when modifications are to be
made to the work or its name.'" Diamond, supra note 9, at 277 (footnotes omitted)(quoting
CL & TW, Netherlands, Copyright Statute, Article 25).
German copyright statutes afford inclusive statutory protection of one's paternity interest,
see Strauss, supra note 9, at 509, and provide that the assignee of a copyright usually cannot
modify the work, its title, or the author statement, without the author's consent. See id. at 510.
Unlike the French system, in which duration of one's moral rights is perpetual, German moral
rights protection expires with the copyright. Treece, supra note 9, at 505.
24. See note 23 supra.
25. Strauss, supra note 9, at 506-09.
26. Diamond, supra note 9, at 245. Subsidiary rights of the moral rights doctrine, which
have not been uniformly accepted by moral rights jurisdictions, and therefore, will not be
discussed in this note, include: "(1) the right to create a work; (2) the right to publish a work;
(3) the right to withdraw a published work from sale; (4) the right to prevent 'excessive'
[vexatious] criticism of a work; and (5) the right to prevent any other violation of the author's
personality." Strauss, supra note 9, at 511 (footnote omitted); see id. at 511-14.
27. See Diamond, supra note 9, at 261.
28. See Roeder, supra note 18, at 567.
29. A major obstacle to United States membership in the Berne Convention is the ab-
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the doctrine of moral rights per se, 30 the courts have, in isolated
cases, exhibited sensitivity toward the artists' interests without men-

tioning the concept of droit moral.31 In Clemens v. Belford, Clark &
Co., 2 the court said in dictum that an author may prevent matter
not written by him from being attributed to him, regardless of the
absence of injury to his reputation.3 3 The court, however, refused to
enjoin a publisher from publishing the plaintiff author's sketches
under his pseudonym "Mark Twain." They had been previously published without copyright and under the same pseudonym. The court
held that since the publisher would have had the right to publish the
works under the author's known real name, no greater protection
was due the author's equally well-known pseudonym.3 ' In interesting
dictum, however, the court recognized paternity rights even for the
unknown author, stating:
So to an author of acquired reputation, and, perhaps, a person who
has not obtained any standing before the public as a writer, may
restrain another from the publication of literary matter purporting
to have been written by him, but which, in fact, was never so writsence under American law of any moral rights provision (which is a prerequisite to membership). Roeder, supra note 18, at 557-58; see T. CRAWFORD, AMERICAN ARTIST 98 (1978).
Professor Nimmer states that opposition to the moral right provision by United States "user
groups"-primarily the motion picture and television interests-is one reason for United
States abstention from Berne accession. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of
the Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 524
(1967).
30. One court abruptly dismissed a moral rights "type" argument by an artist who, at
the time, was famous for his "Varga Girl" drawings in Esquire Magazine. In response to his
claim against the publisher for using his material without any signature or credit line, the
federal court of appeals stated:
What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law in this country to conform
to that of certain other countries. We need not stop to inquire whether such a
change, if desirable, is a matter for the legislative or judicial branch of the government; in any event, we are not disposed to make any new law in this respect.
Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947).
Some courts have felt that sufficient protection is afforded by common law theories without having a separate and distinct moral rights doctrine. See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 299
F.2d 706, 709 n.5 (2d Cir. 1962); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 339-41 &
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 575, 89 N.Y.S.2d
813, 818 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
31. See, e.g., Curwood v. Affiliated Distribs., 283 F. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); De Bekker v.
Frederick A. Stokes Co., 168 A.D. 452, 153 N.Y.S. 1066 (1915), modified on reargument,
172 A.D. 960, 157 N.Y.S. 576, affid, 219 N.Y. 573, 114 N.E. 1064 (1916); Ellis v. Hurst, 66
Misc. 235, 121 N.Y.S. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
32. 14 F. 728 (C.C.N.D. II. 1883).
33. Id. at 731.
34. Id. at 732.
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ten. In other words, no person has the right to hold another out to
the world as the author of literary matter which he never wrote
35

In Clemens v. Press Publishing Co.3 6 the plaintiff author sold
publication rights to a story containing his name. When the defendant would publish the story only anonymously, the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the unattributed publication. In holding for the plaintiff,
the court stated:
Even the matter-of-fact attitude of the law does not require us
to consider the sale of the rights to a literary production in the
same way that we would consider the sale of a barrel of pork. Contracts are to be so construed as to give effect to the intention of the
parties .

. .

. If the intent of the parties was that the defendant

should purchase the rights to the literary property and publish it,
the author is entitled not only to be paid for his work, but to have
it published in the manner in which he wrote it. The purchaser
cannot garble it or put it out under another name than the auauthor, unless
thor's; nor can he omit altogether the name of the
37
his contract with the latter permits him so to do.
Certain editing and marketing practices by commercial distributors of artistic creators' work have been held actionable under theories of libel and slander. 38 For example, in Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co.,39 the plaintiff, a celebrated writer on life in Palestine,
sued the defendant for publishing an article about Hebrew marriage
customs that erroneously was purported to have been written by
plaintiff. In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action in
libel, the court noted that attribution of the article to the plaintiff
would present her to the public as a fraud and would injure her
reputation.4 °
While other authors have sought protection under similar theories, tort law generally is inadequate in the area of author's rights.
The major problem is that the injunctive relief normally sought by
authors is infrequently available under libel and slander.4 1 Further35. Id. at 731.
36.

67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910).

37. Id. at 183-84, 122 N.Y.S. at 207-08.
38. See D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 A.D. 453, 139 N.Y.S. 200, modified, 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913); Gershwin v. Ethical Publishing Co., 166 Misc. 39,
I N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937).
39.

251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929).

40.

Id. at 255-56, 167 N.E. at 434.

41.

See Roeder, supra note 18, at 567; Comment, supra note 10, at 1555.
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more, the elements of this tort are restrictive in that the plaintiff
must possess an existing reputation.4
There are similar obstacles to success on a privacy claim. Privacy, in tort law, generally can be summarized as a right to protection against use of one's name or likeness for commercial purposes
without consent.4" By requiring the existence of a known reputation
inorder to bring a privacy action, however, the unknown creator is
denied protection of his integrity and paternity interests. 44 Another
drawback to such an action is that courts have construed it as a
private action: It may not be assigned 45 and will not survive the
death of the person whose right was violated. 46 Therefore, if a work
passes to heirs or is assigned or sold, the holder cannot rely on a
privacy action to prevent mutilation. Unlike some European moral
right statutes, 47 the privacy theory fails to assure the artistic creator
that the protection will continue after his or her death.
American courts have more frequently relied on contract law
than any other theory to determine the extent of protection for artistic creators.' 8 Courts have traditionally provided no more or less protection than that which the artists obtained through their own bargaining with commerical distributors, or that which can be inferred
from the contract terms . 9 Freedom-of-contract principles have been
42.
43.

See Diamond, supra note 9, at 265.
See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 51, 52 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1981-1982);
see generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
44. "These authors find themselves in an uneviable position-unable to protect their
work because they have not developed reputations, and unable to develop reputations because
they cannot protect their work." Comment, supra note 10, at 1550.
45. Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich and Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 766-67 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935).
46. Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 83
(1965).
47. In France, the duration of moral rights protection is presumably perpetual. In Germany, it expires 50 years after the death of the author. In Switzerland and the United Kingdom, however, it terminates with the artistic creator's death. Diamond, supra note 9, at 277;
Treece, supra note 9, at 505.
48. See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d
522 (7th Cir. 1947); Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728 (C.C.N.D. I11.
1883); Harris
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); De Bekker v. Frederick A. Stokes Co., 168 A.D. 452, 153 N.Y.S. 1066 (1915), modified on reargument, 172 A.D.
960, 157 N.Y.S. 576, affd 219 N.Y. 573, 114 N.E. 1064 (1916); Packard v. Fox Film Corp.,
207 A.D. 311, 202 N.Y.S. 154 (1923); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d
363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 25 A.D.2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, affid, 18 N.Y.2d
659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966); Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, 6 Misc. 2d 383,
162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 1957), afid, 12 A.D.2d 474, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960).
49. The artistic creator's "so-called 'moral right' is controlled by the law of contract."
Edison v. Viva Int'l Ltd., 70 A.D.2d 379, 384, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (1979) (citation
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applied with as much force to artistic works as to any commercial
product;50 hence the key problem becomes the unknown and developing author's inability, because of his inferior bargaining position to
reserve in the contract any meaningful rights.
The case of Granz v. Harris5' demonstrates one court's unusually broad construction of contract terms to impose duties on a record company not to market creative work that was subjected to unauthorized changes. The plaintiff, a well-known jazz producer, sold
record masters to the defendant under a contract that required use
of the credit line "Presented by Norman Granz" in distribution of
records cut from the masters. The defendant made unauthorized cuts
in the plaintiff's recordings and represented these abbreviated versions as the plaintiff's work. The court stated that the contractual
duty of the defendant to use the legend "Presented by Norman
Granz" carried with it "by implication, without the necessity of an
express prohibition, the duty not to sell records which make the required legend a false representation. ' 52 The court stated that while
ordinarily the defendant could present records made from plaintiff's
masters without informing the public of plaintiff's connection with
the product, in this particular case the defendant's sale of the
abridged recordings was a breach of contract.53
The plaintiff in Granz was probably able to obtain such a
credit-attribution clause because of the strong bargaining position
his renown afforded him. Other creators, however, unable to bind a
publisher by contract to provide credit for their work, have found the
courts unreceptive to claims that a right of correct attribution has
been violated. 4 Where contracts contain a broad grant of rights or
control to a publisher and no express clause concerning credit, courts
take a most restrictive view of the author's paternity rights.55 The
cases indicate that the contract between the author and his publisher
is the sole "repository of all that American law recognizes in the way
of paternity rights. 56 In light of the inferior bargaining position of
omitted).
50.
51.

See cases cited note 48 supra.
198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).

52. Id. at 588.
53. Id.
54.

E.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 525-26 (7th Cir. 1947); Harris v. Twen-

tieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
55.

E.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 525 (7th Cir. 1947); Harris v. Twentieth

Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
56. Treece, supra note 9, at 494-95 (footnote omitted); accord,Harris v. Twentieth Cen-
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most artists, this is discouraging for the artistic community. 57
The common law provides, at best, unpredictable and inconsistent bases for recognizing and enforcing what can be considered integrity and paternity rights. Whether protection will be afforded by

the law may depend upon each court's perception of the role of artists in, and their contribution to, society. If a particular court believes that artistic creations have a value beyond their function as
commodities and that artists deserve status somewhat above that of
commercial manufacturers, it may seek to advance the interests of

the artistic community through creative interpretation of common
law doctrine. If, on the other hand, a court views the value of artistic
work no differently than that of a mere "barrel of pork,"58 the artistic creator can expect no greater protection than that provided by
the terms of the contract.
IV.

STATUTORY APPROACHES TO AUTHORS' RIGHTS

A federal statutory approach to the protection of authors' and
artists' rights would seem to have the distinct advantage of lending
uniformity and certainty to a field clouded by unworkable common
law theories. Two bodies of federal statutory law are indeed applied
by the courts in this area: the Lanham Act, 59 which is the federal
trademarks act, and the Copyright Act. 0 It is clear, however, that
Congress did not intend these statutes to vindicate moral rights;
tury Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
57. See text accompanying notes 48, 55 supra. Typically, one of the clauses in a literary-purchase agreement between an author and a motion picture producer would provide as
follows:
Author agrees that Producer shall have the unlimited right to vary, change,
alter, modify, add to and/or delete from the Property, and to rearrange and/or
transpose the Property and change the sequence thereof and the characters and descriptions of the characters contained in the Property, and to use a portion or portions of the Property or the characters, plots or theme thereof in conjunction with
any other literary, dramatic or other material of any kind. Author hereby waives the
benefits of any provision of law known as the "droit moral" or any similar law in
any country of the world and agrees not to institute, support, maintain or permit
any action or lawsuit on the ground that any motion picture or other version of the
Property produced or exhibited by Producer, its assignees or licensees, in any way
constitutes an infringement of any of the Author's droit moral or is in any way a
defamation or mutilation of the Property or any part thereof or contains unauthorized variations, alterations, modifications, changes or translations.
Berman & Rosenthal, Screen Credit and the Law, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 156, 187-88 (1962).
58. Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 184, 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (Sup. Ct.
1910); see text accompanying note 37 supra.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
60. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979).
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hence the protection they offer authors and artists can and does fall
short of that needed to protect the paternity and integrity interests
recognized under the European system."
Although the Copyright Act specifically covers artistic property,62 it is inadequate to protect an author's or artist's personal
rights.63 Copyright protection extends only to the economic exploitation of an artistic creation; the moral rights regime, however, shields
the creative personality from wrongful interference.6 4 A further
problem is the statutory requirement that the author retain his copyright when selling his work to another in order to receive copyright
protection.65 Many authors contract away their copyright with all
other rights when selling their work to a publisher.66 Thus, it is not
surprising that American copyright law has been characterized as
"'an owner's statute and not an author's statute. ' 67 It has also been
criticized for offering little significant protection for artistic creations
that are not destined for commercial reproduction, such as sculpture
or other forms of original fine art.68
Recently, courts seem to have responded to the inadequacies of
common law principles and the copyright statute by turning to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act69 as a shield for artistic creators
against alleged injurious editorial practices. This statute has been
applied generally, although not exclusively, to protect rights of attribution of authorship. The relevant portion of the act provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers for
61.
62.
63.

See text accompanying notes 64-179 infra.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. III 1979).
Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 113-118 (Supp. III 1979) (scope of protected economic

rights) with Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 6bis (scope of personal rights).
64.

When an artist creates, be he an author, a painter, a sculptor, an architect or a

musician, he does more than bring into the world a unique object having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world part of his personality and subjects it
to the ravages of public use. There are possibilities of injury to the creator other

than merely economic ones; these the copyright statute does not protect.
Roeder, supra note 18, at 557 (citation omitted).
65. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (Supp. III 1979); see, e.g., Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F.
Supp. 600, 643-44 (E.D. Pa.), affid, mem., 612 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1979).

66. Under the Berne Convention, rights of integrity and paternity transcend copyright
ownership and transfer. Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 6bis.
67. Comment, supra note 10, at 1542; accord., Sarraute, supra note 9, at 484-86.
68. "From a theoretical perspective, however, original art works do not fit properly into
copyright categories, and copyright remains primarily a legal device to protect reproductive
rights." Fishman, The Emergence of Art Law, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 481, 494 (1977).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
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goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describ&or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services
to enter into commerce . . . shall be liable to a civil action by any
person . . . who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by
the use of any such false description or representation."0

One court perhaps best assessed the application of this section
as follows:
Despite its broad language and arguably catholic scope, courts
have agreed that this section does not have unlimited application to
all deceptive trade practices or to all claims of unfair competition.
• . . Instead, it "is directed only against a certain kind of advertising-false representation of goods or service[s] in interstate commerce." .. .
In attempting to define -what kinds of false advertising are
within the Act, courts have established very few firm guidelines.7 1

The court then went on to note that court decisions "recognize that
the Act proscribes sales diversions caused by false advertising of de-

fendant's goods, and that those diversions can be equally harmful to
competitors regardless of whether the misrepresentations falsely describe defendant's products in isolation or falsely connect its products with plaintiff's products."7 2 Indeed, many courts have broadly
interpreted the statute to provide a remedy for deceptive misdescription of one's own product that would deprive a competitor of his
market share. 73 For cases of false attribution of authorship or muti70. Id.
71. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393, 407 (N.D. I1l. 1979) (citations omitted), revd on other grounds, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 408. Courts have not uniformly construed the elements, scope, remedies and
standing for a section 43(a) claim due to its general language. For example, on the question of
standing, section 43(a) designates two classes of persons who can sue: (1) "any person doing
business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality
is situated"; and (2) "any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use
of any such false description or representation." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). The open-ended
language of the second class of plaintiffs seems to have led to some discrepancy among courts
in their interpretation of standing under this section. See Germain, Unfair Trade Practices
UnderSection 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far,Maybe?,
64 TRADEMARK REP. 193, 201-05 (1974). Part of the problem is that courts seem to have
disregarded these elements when applying section 43(a) to artistic creators' rights, resulting in
a haphazard approach. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1976).
Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546
73. See, e.g.,
(2d Cir. 1956); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 650-51 (3d Cir.
1954); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 782-83 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Gold
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lation to fall within the purview of section 43(a), however, courts
have adopted an unprecedented and unprincipled reading of the
74
statute.
In Autry v. Republic Products, Inc.,71 one of the earliest cases
dealing with this application of section 43(a), the plaintiff, a famous
actor, sought to enjoin a film producer, who had the contractual
right to edit plaintiff's films, from cutting seven minutes of his screen
performance and injecting advertising into the television version of
one of the plaintiff's films. The trial court's inquiry went no further
than the contract terms and held that the defendant had the right to
cut, edit and revise the film in any manner, to any length and for
any purpose. 6 The court of appeals upheld the defendant's right to
of the lower court's
make the seven-minute cut, but disapproved
7
rights.
editing
blanche
carte
of
granting
The plaintiff argued that, regardless of his consent to editing by
the defendant, the alteration of the film (which rendered it substantially different from the product that plaintiff had produced) and the
attribution of the work to the plaintiff violated the Lanham Act. In
rejecting this claim, the court concluded that the Lanham Act does
not apply where the plaintiff contractually consented to the very sort
of editing he later finds objectionable. 78
Twenty years later, in Landon v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp.,79 a court was again presented with an alleged Lanham Act
violation. The plaintiff, the author of a serious novel, sold the work
to a film producer for use in a television movie. The contract gave
the defendant the right to change, adapt, and substantially alter the
work, and imposed a corresponding duty on the defendant to give the
plaintiff appropriate credit for her contribution to the material upon
which the movie had been based. The plaintiff claimed that her work
and reputation were damaged by the defendant's attributing to her a
television version which made light of her serious novel by the insertion of dubbed audience laughter and other changes. The television
Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 939 (D.D.C. 1955), afid sub nom., S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956). For a more
restrictive interpretation of section 43(a), see Germain, supra note 72, at 209.

74. See notes 155-179 infra and accompanying text.
75,

104 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1952), affld, 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954).

76. Id. at 920-21.
77.

213 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1954), afl'g, 104 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal. 1952).

78. Id. at 669-70; accord, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 27 (2d
Cir. 1976) (Gurfein, J., concurring).
79. 384 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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series was advertised as "based on" her book. The court refused to
enjoin this attribution since, despite substantial revision of the theme
of the story, the representation that the story was based on the book
was exactly what plaintiff had bargained for in her contract with the
defendant. Alluding to the Lanham Act, the court, in dicta, noted
that "plaintiff would have a valid claim against defendants if they
had falsely attributed authorship of the series to her." 0 The contract terms, however, precluded any such action under the facts of
the case because the plaintiff contracted to require the defendant to
credit her. 81
These two cases demonstrate the traditional reluctance to recognize the existence of certain rights in the author beyond those spelled
out in a contract. Even the broad language of section 43(a) proved
inadequate, in these cases, to free the court from a contractual analysis. Several celebrated recording artists, however, have successfully
vindicated their rights of attribution under Lanham Act claims, precluding their former recording companies from 2falsely designating
old recordings as recent creations of the artists.
In Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp.,8" an internationally renowned jazz guitarist obtained an injunction restraining defendants from manufacturing and promoting as plaintiff's new material a jazz album containing altered recordings made by him several
years earlier, when he was still an unknown member of a studio
band.84 The defendant record producer owned all rights to the material recorded by a jazz group to which Benson had belonged ten
years before; but unlike his later solo material which brought him
stardom, Benson had had no control over the musical style, contents,
or production of this older recording.85 The defendant re-mixed an
old recording to accent Benson's guitar track and over-dubbed sexually suggestive moaning of a woman on one selection. The album
80.

Id. at 459 (emphasis added).

81. Id.
82. This is not to imply that the courts' construction of the Lanham Act is more sympathetic to recording artists than to other artistic creators. The cases in which recording artists
succeeded under section 43(a) dealt primarily, if not solely, with claims of false designation of
authorship, rather than claims of unconsented-to modification and mutilation. Furthermore,

the defendants in the recording artists' cases, see cases cited note 94 infra, had no contractual
right to use the respective artists' names in the manner complained of by the plaintiffs,

whereas editing rights were indeed specified in the contract in the Autry case. See text accompanying notes 83-101 infra.
83. 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
84. Id.

85. Id. at 517.
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jacket displayed a recent photograph of Benson and his name in bold
letters. In addition, the front cover was captioned "x-rated L.P.""
The court found that the use of Benson's name and picture on
the album and in advertisements created the false impression that he
was responsible for the album's contents.8 7 Both the recent photograph and promotional claims of "new material" deceptively portrayed the album as a current release. The court held that in failing
io state on the album cover the age of the material and the fact that
Benson was a mere studio player on the selections, the defendant's
jacket design and advertising constituted false representations in violation of section 43(a).88 Moreover, the court found that the defendant's misrepresentations would cause irreparable harm to Benson's
artistic reputation and professional stature. Consumers would be induced to buy the album, expecting to experience the unique style
that had led to Benson's fame.8 9 Instead, the inferior style and content of defendant's production would disappoint them and discourage
them from buying Benson's future releases.
In order to obtain injunctive relief in a section 43(a) action, the
court held that plaintiff need only show a "likelihood of consumer
deception," 90 and concluded that the defendant's representations
would more than likely mislead consumers. 91 In fact, the court found
the deception so extreme that the remedy of ordering explanatory
labels on each album cover was rejected as inadequate protection of
Benson's reputation. 2 The court's injunction restrained defendants
from manufacturing and selling the album.93
There have been other cases where the courts have construed
section 43(a) to protect artists in similar situations. 94 It is advantageous to the aggrieved artist, who ideally seeks equitable relief
(where the harm is to his artistic personality and not his pocketbook), to show only the likelihood of, rather than actual, consumer
deception or confusion to obtain an injunction. 95 In Benson, the
86. Id.
87. Id. at 518.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. CBS v. Gusto Records, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Noone v. Banner
Talent Assocs., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968).
95. Benson, 452 F. Supp. at 518.
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plaintiff apparently met this standard without furnishing even
outside testimony as to consumer confusion.96
Not every court will fashion as extreme a remedy as did the
Benson court. In CBS Inc. v. Gusto Records, Inc.,97 a similar case
decided prior to Benson, the court declined to enjoin the sale of an
album bearing a current likeness of Charlie Rich, a nationally
known country music singer, but containing songs just as they had
been recorded by Rich ten to fifteen years before his success. The
court instead ordered that a decal be affixed to each album to clarify
its contents.98 Whether an explanatory label or legend is sufficient to
protect an author from false or inaccurate attribution has been a
99
controversial issue.
Considering the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff in
Benson resulting from the defendant's deception, would the court in
that case have ordered the removal of albums from the market if the
defendant had already begun distribution? Or would the remedy
have been tempered by evidence of the defendant's substantial investment in his product? 100 Under certain moral right statutes 0 1 this
problem is dealt with by permitting the author to withdraw the work
from publication if he compensates the publisher; whether such a
balancing of interests can or will be achieved under the Lanham Act
is yet to be seen.
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies,0 2 a 1976
case involving a group of British comedy writers and performers
(collectively known as "Monty Python"), the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals all but equated Lanham Act protection with the concept
96. But see Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 587 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968). In Yameta, plaintiff had
submitted affidavits of a retail record dealer that asserted that the album produced and sold by
defendant had confused his customers. This case suggests, therefore, that a court may very
well demand greater proof by the plaintiff, in order to succeed under section 43(a), than that
required by the court in Benson.
97. 403 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
98. Id. at 449. The Benson court distinguished CBS on the ground that Rich made a
major contribution to the older work, while Benson's contribution was grossly misrepresented.
This greater deception required a stronger remedial approach. See 452 F. Supp. at 518.
99. See The Thirtieth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946,
67 TRADEMARK REP. 471, 566-67 (1977) (annual report) [hereinafter cited as The Thirtieth
Year Report].
100. Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, 330 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (defendant's substantial investment is factor in denying injunctive relief).
101. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 9, at 513 nn.30-31 (discussing copyright laws of Germany and Italy and case law in France).
102. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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of moral rights. This group of British artists, known for their unique
comedy style, had originally contracted with the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) to televise certain performances.103 Under the
contract, the BBC was expressly precluded from arbitrarily editing
or tampering with scripts prior to broadcasting. The contract, however, contained no express prohibition against alteration of a completed taped show.10 ' The BBC sold the rights to several of the taped
programs to Time-Life Films, which subsequently sold them to the
defendant, the American Broadcasting Company, for national telecast in the United States. 0 5 The defendant edited out thirty minutes
of the original ninety minutes of material. The plaintiffs claimed
that the alterations constituted mutilation and sought a preliminary
injunction ten days before the scheduled broadcast.106
While the trial court refused to enjoin the telecast, it did order
defendant to disclaim, on the air, plaintiffs' responsibility for. the
televised version.'0 7 On appeal, the court held that the edited version
impaired plaintiffs' creative integrity and publicly represented as the
plaintiffs' creation what was actually "a mere caricature of their talents."108 A preliminary injunction issued to prevent future broadcasts.10 9

Although the court's reasoning primarily involved principles of
copyright and contract law,"10 the majority also held, alternatively,
that the plaintiff was likely to prevail under section 43(a)"' and that
defendant's editing constituted a violation of section 43(a)."' The
court also held that within the Lanham Act context an artist retained his right to artistic integrity in his creation even absent the
protection of a trademark or the reservation of a property right."
The court reasoned that section 43(a) was enacted to prevent
misrepresentations that could injure one's business or personal reputation, and concluded that the network's television broadcast created
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id. at 17 n.2.
105. Id. at 17-18.
106. Id. at 18.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 25.
109. Id. at 26.
110. The court recognized that the plaintiffs, as holders of an uncontested copyright in
the original script, could enforce the contract provisions limiting the right of the BBC to edit
material against subsequett purchasers of broadcast rights. Id. at 19-21.
111. Id. at 24-25.
112. Id. at 24.
113. Id.
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a false impression that the plaintiff was the creator of an edited version which sharply deviated from the original work, thus subjecting
him "'to criticism for work he had not done.'"11 The court stated
that the artist alone, rather than his commercial distributor, suffers
the consequences of the mutilation in that the public can judge his or
her work only on the basis of the altered (edited) version.11 5 In such
cases, the court concluded, the plaintiff seeks "to redress the very
rights sought to be protected by" section 43(a).11 6
Judge Gurfein concurred as to the ultimate result on the contract and copyright rationales, but disagreed with the majority's application of section 43(a):
So far as the Lanham Act is concerned, it is not a substitute for
droit moral which authors in Europe enjoy. If the licensee may, by
contract, distort the recorded work, the Lanham Act does not come
into play. If the licensee has no such right by contract, there will be
a violation in breach of contract. . . . The vice complained of is
that the truncated version is not what the plaintiffs wrote. But the
integrity. It only goes to
Lanham Act does not deal with artistic
11 7
misdescription of origin and the like.
Judge Gurfein also criticized the remedy of enjoining future broadcasts of the program.11 8 In his view, a disclaimer indicating the
plaintiffs' disapproval of the edited version would sufficiently cure
any misdescription of origin. With such a disclaimer, "there is no
conceivable violation of the Lanham Act. If plaintiffs complain that
their artistic integrity is still compromised by the distorted version,
their claim does not lie under the Lanham Act, which does not protect the copyrighted work itself but protects only against the misdescription or mislabelling. 1 1 9
This concurring opinion points up the view of prior case law,
under which the contract remains the repository of all rights of integrity that the artistic creator seeks to preserve. 20 Judge Gurfein
asserted that relief under the Lanham Act will not be available if the
contract provides a publisher with the right to edit an author's work:
"[I]f the [copyright] licensee may, by contract, distort the recorded
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 24 (quoting Roeder, supra note 18, at 569); see id. at 24-25.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. (Gurfein, J., concurring).
Id. (Gurfein, J., concurring).
See text accompanying notes 60-67 supra.
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work, the Lanham Act does not come into play."12' 1

The Monty Python case has received mixed reactions from commentators. 2 2 This appears to be the first case in which the Lanham
Act was applied both to prevent misrepresentation of authorship and
to protect the creative work from mutilation and distortion by the
publisher. 125 Perhaps the most valuable legacy of the Monty Python
decision is the majority's recognition of a distinction between an author's property right in a work and any personal rights attached to
that same creation,1 2' and of the need for greater protection for the
12 5
latter interest.
The case that has taken the Lanham Act furthest in this area of
the law, Follett v. New American Library, Inc., 26 concerned a famous novelist who sought to prevent his former publisher from at-

tributing authorship to him of a book he claimed he merely edited.
When Ken Follett was relatively unknown, he had contracted

with a British publishing company to rewrite an English translation
of a French journalistic piece dealing with a famous French robbery.

Follett was to receive £850 for his services. 27 Realizing the extent of
his involvement in the reconstruction of the story, however, Follett
demanded a by-line and insisted on a copyright for the rewrite; the
12 8
defendant later claimed that this evidenced Follett's authorship.

After negotiations with the British publisher, Follett withdrew his

demand for the copyright and instead agreed to the following attribution which appeared on the title page: "Rene Louis Maurice with
121. 538 F.2d at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring). Even the majority's reasoning was based
on the evidence of the contract restrictions bargained for by the plaintiffs. The court stated
that the licensee's privilege to adopt the original work to his style or standards for presentation
"does not extend to the degree of editing that occurred here especially in light of contractual
provisions that limited the right to edit [plaintiffs'] material." Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
122. E.g., Comment, Monty Python and The Lanham Act: In Search of the Moral
Right, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 452 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Monty Python]; Comment, Moral Rights For Artists under the Lanham Act: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Cos,, 18 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 595 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.].
123. This note will later examine the wisdom of construing the Lanham Act in this
manner and the reliability of this statute in the area of moral rights. See text accompanying
notes 155-179 infra.
124. As the Gilliam court stated: "Although such decisions are clothed in terms of proprietary rights in one's creation, they also properly vindicate the author's personal right to
prevent the presentation of his work to the public in, a distorted form." 538 F.2d at 24.
125. Id. at 23.
126. 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
127. Id. at 306.
128. Id. at 307.
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Ken Follett.' ' 129 The name preceeding Follett's was a collective pseudonym for the French journalists who wrote the original story. The
pseudonym alone appeared on the book's cover.130
Eventually, the book was sold to the defendant, an American
company, which had at one time published some of Follett's earlier
work.13 1 By this time, Follett had developed a world-wide reputation2
3
as the author of such bestsellers as Triple and Eye of the Needle.
The defendant changed the title of the British publisher's book and
displayed Follett's name on the cover in bold print.3 " In small print
appeared: "with Rene Louis Maurice."'' Only Follett's name appeared on the spine.13 5 While the defendant was planning to promote
this book, Follett's present publisher was preparing to market his latest novel, which was conceived and written solely by him. 3 6 Follett
and his present publisher brought an action, on Lanham Act and
other grounds, to enjoin defendant
from representing that Follett
7
was the author of the book.There was conflicting evidence as to plaintiff's contribution, his
desire for credit, and the distinction between the concepts of authorship and editorship (the former being attributable in the publishing
industry, but not the latter). 3 " The court made a factual determination that although Follett had been hired to edit, his contribution
was that of an author. 39 It also concluded that Follett's rewrite of
the French story was stylistically inferior to his own bestsellers.1,40
The court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims' 4 1 except for the al129.
130.
131.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 308.

132. Id. at 307.
133.

Id. at 308. The attribution read: "by the author of TRIPLE and EYE OF THE

NEEDLE... KEN FOLLETT..." Id.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.

136. Id.
137. In addition to his claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, Follett brought
actions for breach of contract, copyright infringement and for violations under the New York
Civil Rights Law. Id. at 310-11.

138.

Id. at 311.

139.

Id. at 309.

140. Id.
141.

The court held that Follett had no contract rights because the original compromise

about using his name on the title page in the form "Rene Louis Maurice with Ken Follett" did
not constitute a binding agreement among the parties to restrict the defendant's right to display Follett's name on the cover. Follett's copyright claim was also denied based on the finding

that he held no copyright in the published work. The court also held that without a copyright,
Follett could not challenge any alleged defect in the chain of title in the manuscript's copy-
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leged violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and concluded
that any rights Follett held as to proper attribution of authorship
were "co-extensive with his right under the Lanham Act. 142 The
issue, therefore, was ultimately whether designation of Follett as
principal author of defendant's book constituted a false representation actionable under section 43(a).
The court stated that the purpose of section 43(a) was to provide a statutory cause of action for false description or advertisement
of goods to any person likely to be injured by such practices.1 43 In
order to obtain injunctive relief, the injured party need only show "a
likelihood of confusion or tendency to mislead."' 44 The court concluded that section 43(a) provided that where a description of goods
is unambiguous, relief can be granted based on the court's own findings of falsity, without considering evidence of consumer reaction to
such goods.1 45 The court found that the defendant's display of Follett's name on the cover unambiguously represented that he was the
principal author. 46
The court then proceeded to consider the falsity of the defendant's designation. Its factual analysis led to the conclusion that al147
though Follett's "contribution bears certain indicia of authorship,"
reflecting his unique writing style, the text failed to display any of
the "special creative attributes which are associated with his authorship." 148 Therefore, the court stated, the attribution of Follett as
principal author was "literally false. 149
The court compared Follett's case to that of the plaintiff in Benson,1 50 where the paternity aspect of the creator's rights, had come
under the protection of section 43(a). On this authority, the court
unabashedly pronounced that the Lanham Act was designed not only
to protect the public from deception, but also to shield the "author's
personalright" to the integrity of his work and proper attribution of
right between the British publisher and the defendant. Finally, the court concluded that without a copyright, Follett retained no right under the New York Civil Rights Law to restrict the
use of his name to indicate his authorship. 497 F. Supp. at 309-11.
142.

Id. al 311.

143. Id. at 312.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.

147. Id.
148.

Id.

149. Id. Before drawing this conclusion, the court conceded that "the concept of authorship is elusive and inexact." Id.
150. See text accompanying notes 83-93 supra.
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authorship.151
In fashioning a remedy, the court weighed the public interest in
not being misled as to authorship against the commercial interests of
the defendant. As a result of this balancing, the court ordered that
the defendant give attribution to "Rene Louis Maurice with Ken
Follett" in that order, and52 to indicate on the cover and jacket that
1
the work was nonfiction.
In holding that section 43(a) was designed to vindicate the personal rights of authors and artists, the Follett decision expands even
the Gilliam majority's broad interpretation of the Lanham Act's
protective boundaries. The Gilliam decision was based predominantly on principles of copyright and contract law.1 53 That the
Monty Python group held a copyright and obtained certain contractual rights from the broadcasting companies evinced retention of
much control over their work. 1" In contrast, however, Follett held no
copyright, reserved no contract rights, and had initially expressed a
desire to obtain the very same degree of credit he was later to disclaim. The court, therefore, recognized and enforced Follett's personal authorship rights under section 43(a) independent of any contract or property rights. Although the decision in Follett was a
victory for artistic creators, the relation of the court's use of section
43(a) to prior Lanham Act case law is troublesome.
Analysis of the Application of Section 43(a)
The language of the Lanham Act, case law, and commentary
concerning section 43(a) raise troubling questions about the Gilliam
and Follett courts' interpretations of Lanham Act protection in the
area of authors' and artists' rights. Their construction of the statute
should be viewed as unreliable authority offering artistic creators at
best only uncertain protection.
While section 43(a) contains no statement of purpose, the intent
section of the Lanham Act clearly states that the statute is designed
"to protect persons engaged in commerce against unfair competition."1 55 Some courts have held that the parties must be commercial
competitors before a claim under the Lanham Act even arises.156
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

497 F. Supp. at 313 (emphasis added).
Id.
See text accompanying note 111 supra.
See text accompanying note 111 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
E.g., Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 422 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert.
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Authors and artists in situations similar to George Benson 157 and
Ken Follett 58 would be impeded neither by this requirement nor by
case law interpreting the standing requirement under section 43(a),
because these disputes are, in fact, with commercial competitors.
Specifically, these "competitors" are former publishers and producers seeking to capitalize on the artists' recently acquired fame. A
problem arises, however, when an author seeks to bring an action
under section 43(a) against his present and only publisher where the
parties would be characterized not as commercial competitors but, in
effect, as partners.15 There seems to be no logical way, consistent
with the language and intent of the statute, to extend Lanham Act
protection to authors and artists involved in disputes with their current distributors.
Under the Lanham Act, protection should extend, if at all, to
the author or artist whose name has acquired public recognition. 160
Cases generally hold that in order to succeed under section 43(a),
plaintiff's "mark" must have attained a secondary meaning: in other
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955),
aFd sub nom., S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cii.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956). As one court put it: "The purpose, the legislative history, and the
consistent line of authority [restrict] the scope of Section 43(a) . . . to actions involving competitive injury suffered from 'unfair competition'...." Florida ex rel. Broward County v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 329 F. Supp. 364, 366-67 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
In Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a cause of action
under section 43(a) was dismissed because no showing of competition between plaintiff and
defendant was made. In this case, one of the actions brought by plaintiff, a famous actress,
was under section 43(a) against advertisers for imitating her voice (as she had used it in a
television comedy series) on the defendant's television commercials. Plaintiff claimed that because the commercials were anonymous and did not use her name or likeness or in any way
identify her as the source of the voice, her rights under the Lanham Act were violated. The
court rejected this claim and held for defendants. One of the grounds for the court's decision
was the absence of a relationship of commercial competition between plaintiff and defendants.
Id. at 348-49. Contra, National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 376 F. Supp.
733, 746 (S.D.N.Y., 1974) (citation omitted): "Standing to sue exists in anyone who 'is or is
likely to be damaged' by the defendant's use of the disputed mark, and the parties need not be
direct competitors."; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F.
Supp. 366, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). At best, this issue concerning the commercial competition
requirement for a section 43(a) action is unsettled.
157. See notes 83-93 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 126-154 supra and accompanying text.
159. "Once the creator of a work contracts away his right to edit, he has in effect,
brought in a partner in control of the quality of his work, and ultimately, his reputation." The
Thirtieth Year Report, supra note 99, at 567.
160. E.g., Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 422 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc.v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d
Cir. 1954); Florida ex rel. Broward County v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F. Supp. 364, 366-67 (S.D.
Fla. 1971).
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words, distinctiveness as an indication of a source of creation.1 6 1 For
"'[u] nless the public has come to know a particular mark as indicating a particular source of origin, a finding of the requisite falsity
would be anomolous since there would be no standard against which
to measure such falsity.' 162 The unknown and developing author,
therefore, will most likely be foreclosed from section 43(a) protection.
Furthermore, when the Lanham Act is applied as the court did
in Follett, there is a potential for misconstruction of the proof-offalsity requirement. The Follett court held that:
In order to determine whether a description or representation is
false, a court should first assess the meaning of particular representations and then determine whether the claims made are false....
Where a description concerning goods is unambigous, the court can
grant relief based on its own findings of falsity without resort to
evidence of the reaction of consumers of the goods."'
Prior case law, however, demonstrates a more stringent standard of falsity in order for a section 43(a) plaintiff to prevail. In
most cases it is for the plaintiff, not the court, to establish falsity.'"
Not only must the plaintiff prove public deception, but he also must
establish that the deception is material. 65 Many authors may face
greater difficulty in establishing falsity than did Ken Follett, especially in the case of an unknown artistic creator where courts are
without standards by which to measure falsity.
The Follett court also probably erred in choosing to conduct its
own analysis of the deception issue. As one commentator has stated:
"The public's reaction to an advertisement will be the starting point
in any discussion of the likelihood of deception. . .. If an advertisement is designed to impress . . . customers . . . the [reaction] of
161. See cases cited note 160 supra.
162. Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 1981)
(quoting Germain, supra note 72, at 103).
163. 497 F. Supp. at 312 (emphasis added).
164. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 311 (2d Cir.
1972); Girl Scouts of America v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
165. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Chandris Am.
Lines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Weil, Protectability of Trademark
Values Against False Competitive Advertising, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 527, 536-37 (1956). For a
more narrow view of materiality, see Glen v. Advertising Publications, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889,
904 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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[that group] will be determinative." 116 The reaction of the court is
"at best not determinative and at worst irrelevant."'16 7 The Follett
court did not refer, much less defer, to testimony by Ken Follett
readers in its attempt to determine even a tendency to deceive. Furthermore, it was probably also improper for the court to substitute
of the reading public to determine the
its own judgment for that
68
authorship.
of
concept
Some Lanham Act case law shows that truth in representation
of a product constitutes a complete defense to a claim under section
43(a).169 This raises the question of whether an explanatory label or
disclaimer would immunize a publisher or commercial distributor
from a section 43(a) action. Although such labelling may technically
restore truth to the representation of authorship by qualifying the
credit statement of the creative work, there remain administrative
problems in assuring the effectiveness of the disclaimer. Furthermore, as suggested in Gilliam, even where the author's name appears with the edited work in a manner intended to dissociate it from
insufficient protection
the finished product, the disclaimer provides
70
for the artist's moral rights in the work.
166. 1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIFS § 19.2(a)(1), at 656 (3d ed. 1967) (footnotes omitted).
167. American Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). Even though section 43(a) gives a right of action to any person who "believes" that he is or is likely to be damaged by defendant's practices, one writer described the
evidentiary situation of a plaintiff under this section as follows:
[If such a plaintiff is to prevail, it seems equally apparent that he must be prepared
to make a strong factual showing on the following points, leaving as little as possible
to the realm of the "self-evident," or to the assumption, rationalization or judicial
notice:
I. that the defendant's advertisement is in fact false;
2. that it actually deceives a substantial segment of its audience;
3. that such deception is material, in the sense that it is likely to make a
difference in the purchasing decision;
4. that the particular plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as the result
of the foregoing, either by direct diversion of sales from himself to the falsely
advertising competitor, or by lessening of the good will which his own product enjoys with the buying public.
Weil, supra note 165, at 536-37. Whichever of the above-mentioned elements were cited by
the Follett court, they had been established mostly through judicial notice. See 497 F. Supp.
at 312-13.
168. See Sarraute, supra note 9, at 482. Even the court in Follett discussed the complexity of the issue of authorship. 497 F. Supp. at 309, 312.
169. E.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968); Societe Comptoir de
L'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33
(2d Cir. 1962).
170. The Gilliam majority indicated, for example, that a disclaimer would not overcome
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Another major weakness of section 43(a), which is also shared
by theories previously applied to the area of authors' and artists'
rights, is that it offers no protection to an artistic creator against a
waiver or conveyance of contract rights; such a waiver or conveyance
would permit limitless modification or even attribution of credit.17 1 A
final criticism of unfair-competition approaches, such as that embodied in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, is that they are best suited
to protect pecuniary interests, rather than the personal rights of artistic creators. The success of an unfair-competition action hinges
upon the "fortuitous fact that to present a deformed work to the
public may economically injure the creator by depriving him of his
market."17 2 As long as there is no commercial injury, an aggrieved
artistic creator remains without protection under a theory of unfair
competition.1 73 In general, therefore, courts that seek to enforce artistic creators' rights through section 43(a) are going beyond the appropriate scope of the statute,17 4 and one commentator has concluded that "[the Act's efficacy in protecting artists is restricted
. . .inasmuch as the Act is inapplicable if a copyright owner conveys all or part of his right under a contract permitting
1 75
alterations. 1
One positive aspect of the application of section 43(a), however,
has been the availability of remedies. The text of section 43(a) is
silent as to remedies except for the general language that the violator "shall be liable to a civil action. 17 6 Case law indicates that a
lesser standard of proof of consumer confusion and deception is rethe impression made by the broadcast on the viewers who have no means of comparing the
edited version with the plaintiffs original work. 538 F.2d at 25; accord, id. at 27 (Gurfein, J.,
concurring).
171. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 27 (Gurfein, J.,concurring); see Comment, Monty Python,
supra note 122, at 476; Comment, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., supra note 122, at
611.
172. Roeder, supra note 18, at 568.
173. See De Bekker v. Frederick A. Stokes Co., 168 A.D. 452, 455, 153 N.Y.S. 1066,
1068 (1915) (court distinguished economic interest in final product that is presented to public
from author's personal interest in preserving identity of his creation), modified on reargument.
172 A.D. 960, 157 N.Y.S. 576, arfd, 219 N.Y. 573, 114 N.E. 1064 (1916). See also Strauss,
supra note 9, at 525-26.
174. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26 (Gurfein, J.,concurring); The Thirtieth Year Report,
supra note 99, at 566; Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First
Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1029, 1039 (1957).
175. Comment, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., supra note 122, at 611 (footnote omitted).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
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quired for injunctive relief than for an award of damages. 1 " Furthermore, the plaintiff need not prove a defendant's intent to
deceive.178 This aspect of Lanham Act case law proves most advantageous to the author or artist who seeks injunctive remedies over
damages in order to protect his non-pecuniary interests of paternity
and integrity. This one positive point, however, is overshadowed by
numerous weaknesses of section 43(a) in the area of authors' and
artists' rights. In the final analysis, perhaps the most significant aspects of Lanham Act case law as applied to artistic creators are the
courts' implicit recognition of moral rights and the growing realization that federal statutory law is the best means of protection. 17
Recent Legislative Developments

Two major legislative developments-one in California,180 the
other federal 1 8 -have recently appeared. On the federal level, Congressman Barney Frank (D-Mass.) re-introduced a bill initially proposed by his predecessor, Robert F. Drinan, which would amend the
Copyright Act. 82 The bill has not been passed, however, and similar
legislation 8 " introduced in earlier sessions of Congress died in
committee.
California's Art Preservation Act1 8 ' prohibits anyone but the
177. E.g., Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 1965);
Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
178. Apollo Distrib. Co. v. Apollo Imports, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
179. Accord, Treece, supra note 9, at 501.
180. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1981).
181. H.R. 2908, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
182. Id. The bill provides as follows:
Independently of the author's copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work,
the author or the author's legal representative shall have the right, during the life of
the author and fifty years after the author's death, to claim authorship of such work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other alteration thereof, ind to enforce any other limitation recorded in the Copyright Office that would prevent
prejudice to the author's honor or reputation.
Id.
183. H.R. 288, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 8261, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1981). The statute provides:
(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's personality, is detrimental
to the artist's reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their
works of fine art against such alteration or destruction; and that there is also a
public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations.
(b) As used in this section:
(1) "Artist" means the individual or individuals who create a work of fine art.
(2) "Fine art" means an original painting, sculpture, or drawing of recognized qual-
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artist from intentionally defacing, altering or destroying an art work
ity, but shall not include work prepared under contract for commercial use by its
purchaser.
(3) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association or other
group, however organized.
(4) "Frame" means to prepare, or cause to be prepared, a work of fine art for
display in a manner customarily considered to be appropriate for a work of fine art
in the particular medium.
(5) "Restore" means to return, or cause to be returned, a deteriorated or damaged
work of fine art as nearly as is feasible to its original state or condition, in accordance with prevailing standards.
(6) "Conserve" means to preserve, or cause to be preserved, a work of fine art by
retarding or preventing deterioration or damage through appropriate treatment in
accordance with prevailing standards in order to maintain the structural integrity to
the fullest extent possible in an unchanging state.
(c)(1) No person, except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine art which
the artist has created, shall intentionally commit, or authorize the intentional commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work
of fine art.
(2) In addition to the prohibitions contained in paragraph (I), no person who
frames, conserves, or restores a work of fine art shall commit, or authorize the commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work
of fine art by any act constituting gross negligence. For purposes of this section, the
term "gross negligence" shall mean the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to
justify the belief that there was an indifference to the particular work of fine art.
(d) The artist shall retain at all times the right to claim authorship, or, for just and
valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art.
(e) To effectuate the rights created by this section, the artist may commence an
action to recover or obtain any of the following:
(1) Injunctive relief.
(2) Actual damages.
(3) Punitive damages. In the event that punitive damages are awarded, the court
shall, in its discretion, select an organization or organizations engaged in charitable
or educational activities involving the fine arts in California to receive such
damages.
(4) Reasonable attorneys' and expert ivitness fees.
(5) Any other relief which the court deems proper.
(f) In determining whether a work of fine art is of recognized quality, the trier of
fact shall rely on the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of
art museums, and other persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art.
(g) The rights and duties created under this section:
(I) Shall, with respect to the artist, or if any artist is deceased, his heir, legatee, or
personal representative, exist until the 50th anniversary of the death of such artist.
(2) Shall exist in addition to any other rights and duties which may now or in the
future be applicable.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of subdivision (h), may not be waived except by an instrument in writing expressly so providing which is signed by the artist.
(h)(l) If a work of fine art cannot be removed from a building without substantial
physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of such work, the rights
and duties created under this section, unless expressly reserved by an instrument in
writing signed by the owner of such building and properly recorded, shall be deemed
waived. Such instrument, if properly recorded, shall be binding on subsequent own-
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of "recognized quality."1 85 The California act, however, while bearing some similarity to moral rights principles, can be seen as both
"broader and more restrictive" than the European concept. 186 It differs significantly from the Berne Convention's Article 6bis 87 in its
legal approach. Instead of proclaiming a collection of "inalienable
and imprescriptible rights," the statute makes certain conduct actionable within the State of California by an artist or an artist's
heirs. 18 8 Furthermore, the act affords the artist a broad range of
remedies, including injunctive relief, actual damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, and any other relief that the court deems proper.18

Id.

ers of such building.
(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of fine art which is a part of
such building but which can be removed from the building without substantial harm
to such fine art, the rights and duties created under this section shall apply unless
the owner has diligently attempted without success to notify the artist, or, if the
artist is deceased, his heir, legatee, or personal representative, in writing of his intended action affecting the work of fine art, or unless he did provide notice and that
person failed within 90 days either to remove the work or to pay for its removal. If
such work is removed at the expense of the artist, his heir, legatee, or personal
representative, title to such fine art shall pass to that person.
(3) Nothing in this subdivision shall affect the rights of authorship created in subdivision (d) of this section.
(i) No action may be maintained to enforce any liability under this section unless
brought within three years of the act complained of or one year after discovery of
such act, whichever is longer.
(j) This section shall become operative on Janaury 1, 1980, and shall apply to
claims based on proscribed acts occurring on or after that date to works of fine art
whenever created.
(k) If any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid for any reason, such invalidity shall not affect any other
provisions or applications of this section which can be effected without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this section are severable.

185. Id. § 987(c)(1)-(c)(2); see id. § 987(b)(1).
186. Weil, The 'Moral Right' Comes to California,ARTNEWS, Dec. 1979, at 89. As Mr.
Weil further points out:
It goes well beyond the French law, for example, by including the destruction of a
work of art among the acts that are prohibited. (The French theorize that, while an
altered or mutilated artwork can be prejudicial to the honor or reputation of an
artist, a work that has ceased to exist cannot.) On the other hand, the protection it
offers is neither inalienable-theact specifically provides that an artist may sign an
instrument waiving his rights-nor perpetual. The rights granted run only for the
lifetime of the artist and for 50 years thereafter.
Id. at 89 (emphasis in original).
187. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
188. Weil, supra note 186, at 89.
189. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c) (West Supp. 1981).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss2/10

28

Kenduck: Authors' and Artists' Rights in the United States: A Legal Fictio

19821

AUTHORS' AND ARTISTS' RIGHTS

Although the scope of this note precludes an exhaustive critique
of this legislation, there are several drawbacks, some of which are
worth noting. For example, the act requires that the art work be of
"recognized quality."19 0 The unknown and developing artist, therefore, will have difficulty establishing this element because of his obscurity. Another problem is that the statute explicitly covers only
original paintings, sculptures and drawings.19 1 Other art forms are
therefore excluded, and their creators, along with unknown artists,
must still look elsewhere for protection. 9 2
The California act is unclear in the area of paternity rights of
the artist. Under the act, even after sale of a work of fine art, the
creator of such work retains the right "for just and valid reason" to
disclaim authorship of the work."' It remains unclear, however,
whether the artist has a right to prevent the use of his name as creator in connection with the display or other exploitation of his work.
Finally, because the act fails to specify what constitutes such "just
and valid reason," it is unclear whether the artist has a right to disclaim authorship because he finds the display of his work personally
offensive, even though his creation has not been defaced, altered,
mutilated or destroyed. Despite these criticisms, the California statute amounts to a bold recognition of the rights of artistic creators.
Supplemented with an effective enforcement scheme, it can serve as
a springboard for even broader moral rights legislation in other
jurisdictions.'"
The proposed federal copyright amendment would append a
moral rights provision to the current statutory scheme.' 9 5 Unlike the
conduct-oriented California act, 96 the amendment followed the general scheme of the Copyright Act, as well as the Berne Convention,
in that it creates broad rights of paternity and integrity.1
The major criticism of the bill is its lack of clarity and refinement. 198 Providing the artist with a right merely to "object" may be
190. Id. § 987(b)(2), (f).
191. Id. § 987(b)(2).
192. The aggrieved artist also has the burden of showing that the defendant acted intentionally, id.§ 987(c)(1), or with gross negligence, id. § 987(c)(2).
193. Id. § 987(d).

194. See Weil, supra note 186, at 91.
195.
196.
Cong., 1st
197.

See note 182 supra.
Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c) (WEST Supp. 1981) with H.R. 2908, 97th
Sess. (1981).
Compare H.R. 2908, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) with 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 113-118,

501 (Supp. III 1979) and Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 6bis.
198.

Cf. Crawford, Moral Rights and the Artist, AMERICAN ARTIsT, Apr. 1978, at 98,
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an insufficient remedy under many circumstances. 199 Furthermore,

the bill fails to define the duties and liabilities of those who purchase
the sort of art works covered by the proposal. 00 Despite its shortcomings, this bill is to be commended for recognizing moral rights
explicitly. It does not, however, go far enough to provide courts with
needed guidance for enforcing those rights.
V.

PROPOSAL

In the area of authors' and artists' rights, the center of controversy is the contract. As discussed earlier, 01 many courts have recognized only those rights that the author himself has preserved
through bargaining with his publisher. In discussing paternity rights
in the United States, one scholar remarked: "It is fair to say that the
right does not exist in the U.S. unless written into an enforceable
contract . ..

-

With respect to integrity rights, the same writer

commented that the contract remains "the best assurance that an
author can obtain against the use of his work by another in a way he
finds offensive."203 Because contract principles, including the fundamental freedom-of-contract dogma, pervade American commerce,
moral rights legislation should not be patterned precisely on the copyright-like scheme found in the European statutes.
Due to the inherently inferior bargaining position of many authors, their integrity and paternity rights are usually conveyed, along
with other rights, by contract to the publisher. Three major reasons
for this inferior bargaining position are: (1) the author is negotiating
(frequently without an attorney) with a commercial giant; (2) the
author is selling a commodity whose value is frequently not assessable until after exploitation; and (3) the unknown author has no established reputation to use as a bargaining chip.2°4 An author generally must reserve explicitly the right to claim paternity. It follows
that without a right to receive credit, an author will usually have no
205
right to prevent alterations of his work.
In order to protect integrity and paternity rights adequately,
100 (discussing prior version of bill).
199. See Weil, supra note 186, at 92.
200. See id.
201. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
202. Treece, supra note 9, at 505.
203. Id. at 499.
204. See Ringer, Study No. 31, Renewal of Copyright, in 2 OMNIBUS
SION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 105, 188 (1976).
205. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1566.
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federal legislation would be required to regulate the positions of the
author and publisher at the time of the contract. Such legislation
should include a rule of contract interpretation whereby the right to
receive credit is presumed to be reserved. Indeed, some European
countries provide that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, alienation of one of the author's rights of utilization does not
by itself imply the transfer of other rights, which do not necessarily
depend on the right that is transferred. 0° Under such a statute, an
artistic creator must specifically sell his right to be credited for his
works; 207 there would be no conveyance of a "right to publish without giving credit" since it would not be a right necessarily transferred with a mere right to publish.
Arguably, since a simple waiver of this right would effectively
frustrate the letter and spirit of the statute, it should provide that
any absolute waiver or modification of this right should be void if
contrary to public policy. The validity of a waiver must depend on
the public interest. For example, where the waiver's sole purpose is
deception of the public-as in ghost-writing contracts-the waiver
should be void and the true artistic creator should be able to assert
his rights of paternity. On the other hand, if the object of the waiver
is not deception of the public-as when articles are written for compilations (and the views expressed in the entire compilation and not
those of the individual author are essential) and the public realizes
that the whole is a collection of anonymous authors' works-a
waiver should be deemed valid. 20 8 Alternatively, similar protection
could be offered by legislation imposing an implied negative covenant. For example, when an author conveys to the publisher the
right to use his name, a corresponding duty should be imposed not to
2
omit it. 0

These contract-law proposals are far from radical. Courts have
interfered with the freedom to contract in other cases where one
party enjoys a disproportionate bargaining advantage and uses it to
the unreasonable detriment of both the weaker party and the general
public welfare.210 In Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,2" the
206. See Ringer, supra note 204, at 214 (discussing Italian law).
207. A statutory provision like this would have prevented the defendant in Vargas v.
Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, from publishing plaintiff's drawings without attribution. See note
30 supra.
208. Accord, Jones v. American Law Book Co., 125 A.D. 519, 109 N.Y.S. 706 (1908).

209. Berman & Rosenthal, supra note 57, at 162-63; Strauss, supra note 9, at 524.
210. E.g., Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); see
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
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court discussed the elusive concept of "public policy":
Public policy is a term not easily defined. Its significance varies as
the habits and needs of a people may vary. It is not static and the
field of application is an ever increasing one. A contract, or a particular provision therein, valid2 12in one era, may be wholly opposed to
the public policy of another.
Recognition of the distinct role of artistic creators in society,
and of the need for protection beyond contract, copyright, and trademark principles, finds expression in several areas. A number of
courts have strained common law doctrine 1 s and, more recently,
statutory law in an effort to enforce some semblance of moral
rights. 14 The recent California statute represents an articulation of
the state's "public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and
artistic creations." 218 Finally, federal funding for the arts, which has
increased in recent years, is persuasive evidence of a national public
concern for protecting artistic creators and preserving their work. 21 6
In light of this developing public policy, it makes sense for courts to
invalidate any contractual provisions that represent a studied effort
to frustrate that protection. One possible approach would be modeled
on the Uniform Commercial Code and common law doctrines of unconscionability.2
If a court finds, for example, that a contract
clause is contrary to public policy because it absolutely waives the
artistic creator's paternity or integrity rights, the court may refuse
enforcement.
Issues of artistic integrity require the kind of refined evaluation
that is beyond the grasp of judicial analysis.2 18 Even the issue of
attribution of authorship can become complex, although it has been
629, 631-33 (1943); Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental
Breach, 50 VA. L. REV. 1178, 1186 (1964); cf. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 235-b(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981) (court has power to refuse to enforce unconscionable clause in lease);
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978 version) (court may, as matter of law, decline to enforce clause it finds
unconscionable).
211. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
212. Id. at 403, 161 A.2d at 94-95 (citation omitted).
213. See cases cited note 29 supra.
214. See text accompanying notes 69-154 supra.
215. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a); see note 180 supra.
216. See Fishman, supra note 68, at 482 n.9. But see Schonberg, Cuts in Federal Arts
Budgets to Hit Small Groups Hardest, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1982, at Al, col. 5 (proposed
1983 federal budget for National Endowment for the Arts cut).
217. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978 version).
218. See Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 71, 80
N.Y.S.2d 575, 579 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Sarraute, supra note 9, at 482.
REV.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss2/10

32

Kenduck: Authors' and Artists' Rights in the United States: A Legal Fictio
1982]

AUTHORS' AND ARTISTS' RIGHTS

said that the essence of paternity rights is easily enforceable because
it requires only a "determination of whether the author's name appears on the work." ' The Follett case shows that paternity rights
are not so easily guaranteed. Determining the degree of authorship
and proper designations of credit can be an arduous task. Moreover,
the economic implications of such a decision for the interested parties may be staggering. 220 Because of the significance and complexity
of paternity- and integrity-rights issues, courts should be required to
submit these issues to an expert panel for review and recommendation. Such a panel would consist of representatives from the publishing industry, literary guilds, academia and professional critics of the
arts and literaiure. The panel could, for example, make a refined
evaluation of whether a waiver provision in a contract violates public
policy (and, therefore, should not be enforced by the court) or is fair
and reasonable under the circumstances.221 Findings and recommendations by the panel would be admissible but not binding upon
the court. This procedure, which furnishes the judge or jury with the
opinion of an expert panel, has been applied in the area of medical
malpractice litigation,222 which also frequently presents esoteric
issues for judicial consideration.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has demonstrated the inadequacies of
existing legal theories and statutes in providing needed protection to
authors and artists. Present law tends to help those who can help
themselves-the commercially successful artistic creators who have
acquired formidable bargaining power. The law fails to protect the
unknown and developing artistic creator who is the source of tomorrow's cultural achievements. The confusion of common law doctrine and existing statutes indicates an appreciation of the need for
protection, but a failure to analyze and understand thoroughly the
foreseeable problems facing the artistic creator in American society.
Only federal legislation in this area will lend uniformity and predictability. To be effective, however, a federal statute must offer more
219. Comment, supra note 10, at 1561.
220. For example, in the entertainment industry "the credit clauses of an agreement are
often considered of greater importance than the provisions for monetary compensation."

Berman & Rosenthal, supra note 57, at 156.
221,

Cf. id.(motion picture industry uses arbitration panels to resolve issues of screen

credit).
222.

E.g., N.Y.

JUD. LAW

§ 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
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than a mere proclamation of moral rights; such legislation should
focus specifically on the bargaining positions of parties to contracts.
If public policy recognizes art and literature as cornerstones of civilized society, this policy must be articulated and furthered through
enactment of legislation protecting artistic creators; and freedom-ofcontract policies must yield to this recognition.
Neil G. Kenduck
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